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Anotace:
Práce se týká Berkeleyho reakce na newtonovskou dynamiku. Představuje Berkeleyho argumentaci 
proti realistickému pojetí dynamiky a popisuje a hodnotí Berkeleyho pozitivní koncepci fyzikální 
síly jako matematické hypotézy.
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Introduction
The topic my essay is  Berkeley's attitude towards Newtonian dynamics. While Berkeley 
admired the usefulness, simplicity and generality of Newton's laws and principles, he is, none the 
less, concerned with their ontological implications. The view that physical bodies have forces by 
means of which they can causally affect other physical bodies, which was attributed to Newton by 
some of his followers, implies that physical bodies are active and is thus inconsistent with the basic 
principles of Berkeley's immaterialist metaphysics – namely with the view that the only sources of 
activity in the universe are spirits. Berkeley tries to solve this conflict by offering an account of 
force which avoids these undesired metaphysical commitments. My aim in this essay is to describe 
and evaluate this account.
Berkeley's philosophy of science has drawn a lot of attention during the last few decades and 
it has been by many thinkers seen as strikingly modern.1 Berkeley has been interpreted by these 
thinkers as putting forward such contemporary concepts as the underdetermination of theory by data 
thesis, the instrumentalist view of science or the concept of scientific reduction. While I certainly 
agree  with  the  view  that  Berkeley's  philosophy  of  science  has  many  modern  and  interesting 
features, I believe that we have to be very careful when it comes to ascribing to Berkeley the above-
mentioned particular modern concepts, because there is a danger of misinterpreting his views and of 
losing touch with his real philosophical concerns.
In the first chapter of this essay I introduce Newton's view of force and try to show that this 
view is open to a realist interpretation, even though, as I try to show, the realist interpretation is 
certainly not the only possible one. I also discuss the relationship between dynamic realism and the 
17th century  mechanist  paradigm, focusing mainly  on the problem of  possibility  of  action  at  a 
distance which the existence of the force of gravitation posited by Newton seems to imply but 
which was seen as utterly unintelligible by the mechanist thinkers, such as Descartes or Hobbes.
In the second chapter I investigate the relationship between dynamic realism and Berkeley's 
ontological and epistemological views. I argue that dynamic realism is inconsistent with Berkeley's 
metaphysical  and  epistemological  views,  the  main  reason  being  that  our  ideas,  as  something 
essentially passive, cannot represent activity and therefore cannot represent force conceived as a 
cause of motion. Moreover, even though we, according to Berkeley, have a notion of active power 
acquired from knowledge which the mind has of itself  and its  activities,  this  notion cannot  be 
extended to physical bodies. I try to investigate and evaluate Berkeley's reasons for this restriction.
1 See e.g. Newton-Smith 1985, Myhill 1957, Hinrichs 1950.
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In the third chapter I discuss and evaluate three of Berkeley's arguments against the realist 
view of force which he presents in the Principles and in his 1721 shorter work De motu and tackle 
the question whether we are justified in attributing to Berkeley the underdetermination of theory by 
data thesis made famous in the 20th century by Quine, Duhem and others. Berkeley's first argument 
concerns the fact that physics leaves us utterly ignorant of the cause of gravitational attraction and 
therefore we do not have a good reason to any particular version of dynamic realism. The second 
argument I discuss concerns Berkeley's claim that even though various thinkers say very different, 
even opposing things about force, they still attain truths about the physical world by means of the 
concept of force and therefore we should, Berkeley argues, consider force to be a mathematical 
hypothesis  rather than something real in the world.  The third argument I consider concerns the 
semantics of force-terms. Berkeley thinks that since we have no concept of force as a cause of 
phenomena, force-terms, as used by a dynamic realist, are utterly empty and therefore meaningless.
The fourth  chapter  is  a  discussion  of  the  positive  part  of  Berkeley's  project.  I  describe 
Berkeley's view that there should be what we could perhaps call  a 'division of labour'  between 
metaphysics and natural philosophy. While the task of natural philosophy in Berkeley's view is to 
discover regularities in the natural world and in this way arrive at the laws of nature which he sees 
as the grammar of the language in which God speaks to us, the task of investigating the efficient 
causes  of  the  sensible  phenomena,  Berkeley  thinks,  belongs  exclusively  to  the  realm  of 
metaphysics. After that I focus on Berkeley's positive claims concerning physical forces and argue 
that his concept of force has instrumentalist  features.  I also analyze a tension which Berkeley's 
claims about force seem to bring about, a tension between the view that force is nothing but the 
sensible phenomena, on the one hand, and the view that force is a mere mathematical hypothesis, on 
the other hand, and suggest an interpretation of Berkeley's concept of force which would avoid such 
tension.
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1. Newton on force
Berkeley's concept of force, as introduced in the Principles (1710) and in De motu (1721), 
can be seen as a reaction to or a commentary on Newton's understanding of force. Therefore, before 
I discuss Berkeley's approach to force, I will talk about some features of Newton's conception of 
force, focusing mainly on the issue of gravitational attraction. The concept of force is clearly one of 
the  key  concepts  of  Newton's  thinking.  In  his  Philosophiae  Naturalis Principia  Mathematica 
(hereafter  cited as  the  Principia),  a  work first  published in  1687,  Newton states  three laws of 
motion and it is no coincidence that all three of these laws explicitly or implicitly concern forces.2 
Moreover, what Newton calls 'gravity' or 'gravitational attraction', is itself a kind of physical force.3
Newton uses the concept of force to explain the ability of a physical object to causally affect 
another physical object, for example, to set this object in motion, to stop its motion, to change the 
trajectory of its motion or to break the object. Force is then used by Newton to show the regularity 
or lawfulness of the kinetic behaviour of physical bodies, i.e. their motion, rest and the changes 
between these.  The force of gravitational attraction,  for example,  enables us to explain various 
aspects of the kinetic behaviour of physical bodies which we observe on an everyday basis, such as 
the descend of heavy bodies, the movement of the Moon or the tide of the sea.4
Importantly, the concept of force, as used by Newton, is quantifiable.5 By observation and 
measurement of the behaviour and qualities of physical bodies (such as their mass) and by means of 
mathematical calculation, we are, according to Newton, able to arrive at the precise quantity and 
direction of force responsible for a particular movement. For example, Newton's second law of 
motion  tells  us  roughly  that  the  acceleration  of  a  body  depends  directly  on  the  motive  force 
impressed on the body and inversely on the mass of the body.6 We are thus able to calculate the 
quantity of the motive force as long as we have measured and thus quantified the acceleration and 
the mass of the body.  The fact  that  forces are quantifiable  makes them very useful  “tools” for 
making precise predictions about the kinetic behaviour of physical objects.
While the concept of force is highly useful for discovering regularities in nature, it, on the 
other hand, brings about certain philosophical perplexities, the most serious being the question what 
exactly force is. Is force a real entity in the world exercising causal impact on physical objects or is 
it, on the other hand, a purely theoretical entity which does not and cannot exist outside physical 
2 Janiak 2004, pp. 70-72.
3 Ibid., p. 61.
4 Ibid., p. 92.
5 Ibid., p. 86.
6 Ibid., p. 71.
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theories? My main goal in this essay is to discuss Berkeley's answer to this question. However, 
before I do so, I will briefly mention the way Newton answers it.
The realist view of force and its problems
One crucial question we might want to ask about Newton's treatment of force is whether his 
concept of force is a realist one. To hold a realist view of forces, or to be a realist about forces 
means to  hold that  forces  somehow really  exist  out  there in  the world and have a capacity  to 
causally affect physical objects. A realist about force will, for example, say that the descent of a 
stone which I have just dropped is an effect caused by gravitational attraction, a force pulling that 
stone towards the centre of the Earth.  My definition of realism about forces then includes two 
conditions. A thinker is a realist about forces if and only if he claims that (1) forces really exist in 
the  world  and that  (2)  forces  are  (efficient)  causes  of  the  changes  in  the  kinetic  behaviour  of 
physical bodies.7
Clearly, my definition of realism about forces leaves a lot unanswered. We might want to 
know more about the ontological character of force. If forces really exist in the world, what kind of 
entities are they? The basic ontological distinction often used in the 17th century and inherited from 
scholasticism was the one between things and their qualities or, more precisely, between substances 
and their accidents. If we ask whether forces are things or qualities of things, we will notice that 
neither option seems quite unproblematic. It seems to me, however, that the first option (i.e. that 
forces are substances), is much more problematic than the second option (i.e. the view that forces 
are qualities of objects). An example of gravitational attraction might show us why the first option 
is problematic. Gravitational attraction is a force which is active, for example, between me (as a 
physical unit) and all the other physical objects in the universe, even though of course I am attracted 
to these objects with varying degrees of intensity. As Newton puts it, “all bodies gravitate toward 
one another”.8 I am then attracted by gravitational attraction to every single physical object in the 
universe except myself and so is everything else in the universe. One way to elucidate this point is 
to say that it is true for every  x that if  x is a physical object, then  x is attracted by the force of 
gravitational attraction to all physical objects in the universe except x. It seems to me that if we said 
that forces are substances we would end up with an extremely 'bloated' universe. Among the more 
serious problems of the view that forces are substances is the question regarding the spatial location 
of forces.
It seems to me that while the second option (i.e. the view that forces are qualities of objects) 
is more viable, it is also not quite unproblematic. If we claim that forces are qualities, we have to 
7 See Janiak 2007, p. 127.
8 Janiak 2004, p. 88.
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add, it seems to me, that they are rather special qualities, quite unlike any other qualities which we 
ascribe to physical objects. One  reason why forces might be seen as rather special qualities is that 
they do not seem to fit comfortably into either side of the primary – secondary dichotomy. The other 
reason is that it might be seen as problematic that a quality of one physical object would have a 
direct causal influence on the state of motion of another physical object. Let me now briefly say a 
bit more about each of these problems.
It is not clear whether we can unproblematically treat force as either one of primary qualities 
or one of secondary qualities. It was commonly held in the 17th century that macroscopic physical 
objects have two kinds of qualities, the primary ones and the secondary ones.9 The primary qualities 
were taken to be basic in the sense that every physical object in the universe has them and that they 
give rise to secondary qualities and are therefore necessary for their existence. The list of primary 
qualities slightly differed from thinker to thinker, but the classic examples are extension, shape, 
motion  and  (arguably)  solidity.  It  was  commonly  believed  by  the  so  called  'mechanists'  or 
'mechanical philosophers'10 that the universe ultimately consists of submicroscopic particles which 
have only primary qualities.11 Other qualities we commonly ascribe to things around us, such as 
colours, smells or tastes, were called the secondary qualities. John Locke, for example, takes these 
to be strictly speaking just powers of physical objects to cause certain kinds of sensations in our 
minds.12 Locke thinks there is nothing in the objects themselves that would resemble our sensations 
of secondary qualities, such as redness or bitterness, while our perceptions of primary qualities, 
such as extension or movement, do resemble real qualities of physical objects.
According to some thinkers, gravitational attraction – a kind of physical force – should be 
understood as one of the primary qualities. A leading proponent of this view was Roger Cotes, a 
mathematician  and an  astronomer  who closely  cooperated  with  Newton and wrote  the  famous 
introduction to the second edition of Newton's  Principia  published in 1713.  In his introduction 
Cotes claims that “[a]mong the primary qualities of all bodies universally, either gravity will have a 
place, or extension, mobility, and impenetrability will not”.13 It seems to me that treating gravity as 
one of primary qualities is problematic to some extent because, as Janiak emphasizes, gravity does 
not  meet  the  'lonely  corpuscle'  criterion.14 In  other  words,  if  we imagine  a  world  whose  only 
“inhabitant” would be one corpuscle, there would be no gravity at all, while there would still be the 
classical primary qualities such as extension, shape or movement. The reason for this is that for 
9 See e.g. Essay II. 8. 9-13.
10 I will say more about mechanism later in this chapter.
11 See e.g. Essay II. 8. 8.
12 Essay II. 8. 15.
13 Newton 1999, p.392
14 Janiak 2009.
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there to be any sort of attraction there needs to be at least two bodies. Gravity then can exist only in 
the worlds where there are at least two physical particles. Because gravity fails to meet the 'lonely 
corpuscle criterion', it is not a quality that necessarily belongs to any physical body and therefore it 
seems to be problematic to rank it among primary qualities.15
Does  this  mean  that  gravity  is  a  secondary  quality?  This  option  seems  to  be  equally 
problematic. We saw that according to Locke, secondary qualities are powers of objects to cause 
sensations in our minds.16 Clearly, gravity is a kind of power of physical objects, a power to attract 
other physical objects. Does this mean that we can say that gravity is a secondary quality? I don't 
think such a conclusion would be correct for the following reason. Locke thinks that we have an 
idea of active power which we acquire in an imperfect form from the observed interactions of 
physical bodies and in a more perfect form from reflection on the activity of our will.17 It seems 
reasonable to assume that Locke held that our idea of active power bears resemblance with various 
powers of bodies. However, we saw that in the case of secondary qualities there is no resemblance 
between our ideas of them and the qualities themselves. Therefore, it seems reasonable to reject the 
option that gravity might be a secondary quality of bodies.
Another reason to reject this view seems to be the fact that if we say that the redness of a 
rose is a secondary quality, we are saying that ultimately the rose itself is not really red, it just has a 
power to cause sensations of red in a certain kind of perceiving minds. Now for a dynamic realist 
this cannot be true about gravity, since the the universe contains physical forces, not only powers to 
produce our ideas of force.
This is then one argument for the view that it might be problematic to think of forces as of 
qualities of physical objects. It seems to me that it could easily be objected against this argument 
that it  presupposes correctness of the view that all  qualities there are in the universe are either 
primary or secondary. If this supposition is false, then we could easily say that perhaps force is an 
instance of a quality which stands outside the primary – secondary distinction.
I believe this objection is valid. Locke, for example, was aware that forces and powers of 
bodies  to affect  other  bodies  in general do not comfortably fit  on either  side of the primary – 
secondary distinction. This might be why he considers all powers of bodies except their powers to 
affect our senses to be  separate category of qualities.18 He thus distinguishes between powers to 
15 It should, however, noticed that the lonely corpuscle criterion is somewhat controversial as an indication of primary 
qualities. Locke, for example, lists texture as one of the primary qualities (Essay II. 8. 14.) and, arguably, there need 
to be many corpuscles in order for there to be texture. Another problem connected with the use of  this criterion is 
the problem of motion. If we claim that there is only relative motion (as, e.g. Berkeley does in the Principles 114), 
then motion, even though it is a classic example of a primary quality, does not meet the lonely corpuscle criterion.
16 Essay II. 8. 1. and II. 8. 5.
17 Essay II. 21.1.
18 Essay II. 8. 23.
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affect our senses (secondary qualities) and powers to affect other physical bodies (a separate, third 
category).  What  these  categories  have  in  common  is  their  ontological  dependence  on  primary 
qualities.
Even though then my argument isn't conclusive, it at least illustrates some of the problems 
we have to face if we say that forces are qualities of physical bodies. Another reason why this view 
is problematic seems to be that it is questionable whether a quality of an object can causally affect 
the state of motion of another object. This is especially problematic in the paradigm of mechanism, 
in which the state of motion of one body can be altered only if the body collides with or is pushed 
by another body. I will, however, say more about mechanism later.
I have thus defined what I mean by a realist view of force and sketched some of the general 
metaphysical problems that a proponent of this view has to face. I will now tackle the question 
whether Newton was a realist about forces.
Questions about Newton's position
It is not quite clear whether Newton was a realist about forces. There are passages in his 
works that certainly have a realist ring. One such passage is in the General Scholium, a text added 
to the second edition of the  Principia from 1713.19 Here Newton contends that “it is enough that 
gravity really exists,  acts  according to  the laws that  we have set  forth,  and suffices for all  the 
motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea”20. The second edition of the Principia also includes 
the above mentioned introduction by Roger Cotes in which gravity is ranked as a primary quality. 
Another passage,  where Newton himself  speaks as a realist,  is in his  letter  to the editor of the 
Memoirs of Literature weekly paper which was written in 1712 but remained unpublished during 
Newton's lifetime.21 In this letter, a rebuttal of Leibniz's criticism of Newton's theory published in 
the Memoirs in May 1712, Newton states that “God could create planets that should move round of 
themselves without any other cause than gravity that should prevent their removing through the 
tangent. For gravity without a miracle may keep the planets in.”22 Newton seems to be saying here 
that gravity itself can be the cause of circular motion and expresses a realist view of gravity.  It 
seems to me that passages like these might lead us to the view that Newton at the later stages of his 
thought might have inclined towards realism about forces.
However, certain passages from earlier Newton's works suggest that Newton was aware of 
the problems which realism about forces brings about and thought that these problems were serious 
19 Janiak 2004, p. 89-93.
20 Janiak 2004, p. 92.
21 Janiak 2004, pp. 114-117.
22 Ibid., p. 117.
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enough to reject realism. Of course one might speculate whether Newton wasn't perhaps in his heart 
of hearts always a realists who only 'officially' and temporarily accepts the mechanist principles and 
therefore rejects realism about forces. For the purposes of my paper it is not important to decide 
whether Newton really was a realist, all I want to do here is to describe some considerations that 
might pull us towards the various competing interpretations.
It is important to notice that the realist view of forces could have been seen by Newton as 
bringing about certain difficulties. One of these difficulties is the fact that the view seems to imply a 
possibility of action at a distance, while the other one is the problem that the realist view of gravity, 
a kind of force, implies that one body is able to pull another body towards itself. 
I will now explain why these two implications of the realist view of gravity could have been 
seen as problematic. In order to do this I need to say a few words about the so-called 'mechanism' or 
'mechanical  philosophy',  a  view  widely  accepted  in  the  17th and  early  18th century  natural 
philosophy field and held, for example, by Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes and to some extent by 
Leibniz, Boyle and others.23 As Alan Gabbey emphasizes, it is very difficult, perhaps impossible to 
define mechanism or mechanical philosophy.24 For the purposes of my paper I will use the term 
'mechanism'  for a view of the world according to which the whole universe and the processes 
happening  in  it  can  be  understood  in  analogy  to  a  machine,  perhaps  an  extremely  complex 
clockwork,  consisting  ultimately  of  corpuscles,  submicroscopic  particles  which  have  only  the 
above-mentioned primary qualities. The macroscopic objects around us, such as tables or chairs, 
have, on the other hand, two kinds of qualities, primary and secondary.25 Importantly, just like it 
seems to be the case in a clockwork, according to mechanism, causal interactions in the natural 
world only happen by impulse and one particle can only push another particle, it can never pull it 
towards itself. 
In the mechanist paradigm then the only way in which a physical body can directly causally 
affect another body is by impulse.26 In other words, there can only be direct causality between two 
objects if there is physical contact, i.e. if the two objects collide, or if one of them pushes the other 
one.  If,  on the other hand, the two bodies are distant from each other and there is no physical 
intermediary between them (i.e. there is only vacuum between them) there is for a mechanist no 
way the two bodies could causally interact. This principle is expressed, for example in Leibniz's 
letter to Clarke where Leibniz writes that “[a] body is never moved naturally, except by another 
body which touches it and pushes it; after that it continues until it is prevented by another body 
23 Gabbey 2002, pp. 337338.
24 Ibid., p. 337.
25 See e.g. Downing 2005, p. 231.
26 Janiak 2007, p. 128.
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which touches it. Any other kind of operation on bodies is either miraculous or imaginary.”27
Newton's concept of gravitational attraction was seen by some thinkers as inconsistent with 
the principle of impossibility of action at a distance. This criticism was raised, for example, by 
Leibniz in the Theodicy28 as well as in some of his letters to Samuel Clarke, a friend and disciple of 
Newton's. In the third letter, he uses the principle of impossibility of action at a distance to criticize 
Newton's concept of gravitational attraction.29 He claims that there cannot be a natural explanation 
of the situation in which a physical body moves freely around another physical body in circles 
without something else constantly acting upon the circling body by impulse. As we saw, according 
to the mechanists, the only way to causally affect a body is by impulse. However, for a movement 
of a body to be circular, the body needs to be constantly affected because, once it it stops being 
affected, it will stop moving in circles and will start moving in a tangent to the circle. Therefore, in 
the  mechanist  paradigm for  a  body to  circulate  it  needs  to  be  constantly  pushed.  This  is  why 
Leibniz, for example, explains planetary motion by the presence of vortices.30 These vortices of 
moving liquid act on the planetary bodies by impulse and thus cause them to move in ellipses. 
However, ex hypothesi the circulating body is moving freely (i.e. without being constantly pushed 
by anything else).  Such a free circular  movement then cannot  be – in  mechanism – explained 
naturally, it has to be a result of a miracle.31 Leibniz claims that “'[t]is also a supernatural thing, that 
bodies should attract one another at a distance, without any intermediate means”.32 According to 
Leibniz  then,  if  Newton's  theory  presupposes  action  at  a  distance,  as  he  thinks  it  does,  it 
presupposes a perpetual miracle, and clearly a theory which presupposes a miracle doesn't really 
explain anything.
There are passages in Newton's writings which signal that he shared the mechanist view that 
action at a distance is impossible. In a letter to Richard Bentley, an English theologian, Newton 
claims that “[t]hat gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may 
act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and 
through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an 
absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking 
can ever fall  into it”.33 This passage suggests that Newton might have embraced the mechanist 
principle  of  impossibility  of  action  at  a  distance.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  he  recognizes  the 
27 Alexander 1956, p. 66.
28 See Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, §19.
29 Alexander 1956, p. 30.
30 See Janiak 2007, p. 138.
31 Ibid.
32 Alexander 1956, p. 43.
33 Janiak 2004, p. 102.
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inconsistency of this principle with realism about forces and takes this inconsistency to be a reason 
to reject realism about forces.
Earlier I mentioned another problem of the realist view of gravity, namely its implication 
that one body must be able to pull another body towards itself. It might be clear from what I have 
said about mechanism that this implication is problematic. As we saw in the quote from Leibniz's 
letter, in mechanism pulls, unlike pushes, are not allowed. This principle is revealed in the attempts 
of the proponents of mechanism to account  for cohesion of physical objects.  Since mechanism 
denies the existence of attracting, pulling forces, it was necessary to look for an account of cohesion 
of physical bodies which would not rely on such forces. One attempt to provide such an account 
was Gassendi's  thought  that  corpuscles have 'hooks and claws'  by means of  which cohesion is 
provided.34 The  'hooks  and claws'  hypothesis  is  an  attempt  at  accounting  for  cohesion  without 
employing the notion of power of attraction.
It seems to me that all of these problems implied by the realist view of force might be why 
there are passages in Newton which reject realism about forces in the sense I tried to define above. I 
will conclude my discussion of Newton by mentioning a few of these passages.
Is gravity reducible to mechanical processes?
In some passages Newton tries to come up with a mechanist explanation of gravitational 
attraction. It seems to me that we can call these passages 'reductionist' in the sense that Newton is 
saying here that gravity is really nothing but mechanical processes. When we talk about gravity, we 
are really just  talking about mechanical  processes in a  different way. I  think we can see these 
passages as attempts at accounting for gravity without presupposing the possibility of action at a 
distance or the existence of 'pulls', i.e. forces of attraction.
Newton seems to be proposing such a reductionist view of gravity in a letter to Robert Boyle 
where he suggests that gravity can be understood simply as the workings of an aetherial substance.35 
This view is sometimes referred to as the 'aether hypothesis'.36 This hypothesis has a long history in 
philosophy and might be of a neo-Platonic origin. Newton approached it with varying levels of trust 
and scepticism at different stages of his intellectual development and used it to explain a wide range 
of phenomena, such as the properties of light,  the cohesion of solid bodies, static electricity or 
magnetism.37 Aether  is  characterized  by  Newton  as  a  “substance,  capable  of  contraction  and 
dilitation [i.e. dilation], strongly elastic, and in a word much like air in all respects but much more 
34 See Hill 2004, pp. 612-614.
35 Janiak 2004, pp. 1-4.
36 Gabbey, p. 340.
37 Ibid., p. 341.
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subtle”.38
Regarding  gravitational  attraction  Newton  suggests  that  the  whole  universe  is  full  of 
aetherial substance whose density varies in different areas of the universe. The aether also pervades 
the physical bodies, since it is in their pores, however, there its density is very low.39 Another area 
of low density of aether is around the physical bodies in their vicinity.  Whenever two physical 
bodies move close enough to each other, the following happens: in the area in between these two 
bodies the density of aether grows even lower and at the same time the area of lower density grows 
further from the surfaces of the bodies.40 This has two consequences. Firstly, the area of extremely 
low density of aether between these two bodies will 'try' to return to the normal level of density and 
there will  thus arise reluctance against the two bodies moving any closer towards each other.41 
Secondly,  the aether surrounding the bodies from the other sides will  be much denser and will 
therefore push the bodies towards each other.42 There will thus arise two opposing 'pushes' on the 
two bodies and if these pushes are balanced, the two bodies will keep a constant distance from each 
other, which is the phenomenon Newton tried to explain. Newton seems to be saying here that 
gravity is reducible to something we can account for in  mechanical terms – the activity of aether. In 
the light of this passage, gravity does not seem to be in conflict with the mechanist picture of the 
world because what seems to be action at a distance is ultimately action mediated by aether and all 
the seeming pulls are really just pushes of the corpuscles of aether.
However, later in his writings (Newton's correspondence with Boyle dates back to 1678/9) 
Newton  grew sceptical  of  the  view that  gravitational  attraction  can  be  reduced  to  mechanical 
processes. In the above-mentioned General Scholium,  for example, Newton claims that there is a 
difference in kind between the cause of gravity and the mechanical causes, which means that he saw 
the view that gravitational attraction has a mechanical cause as problematic. He mentions three 
reasons to believe that the cause of gravity is not mechanical. Firstly, he says that the cause of 
gravity “penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without any diminution of its power 
to act”.43 I believe Newton is saying here that the quantity of gravitational attraction between two 
physical objects  is  not diminished by the presence of any number  of physical obstacles placed 
between the two attracted objects. Mechanical causes, such as the workings of aether, on the other 
hand, seem to be of necessity physically influenced and altered by the presence of obstacles. For 
example, even though aether,  ex hypothesi,  pervades all physical bodies through their pores, the 
38 Janiak, 2004, p. 1.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 3.
41 Ibid., p. 4.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 92.
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presence of obstacles still has influence on its workings because it affects its density and thus its 
motion.
Secondly, Newton emphasizes that the force of gravity does not act “in proportion to the 
quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in 
proportion to the quantity of solid matter”.44 This again is a problem for the mechanical explanation 
of  gravity  because  when  it  comes  to  mechanical  causes  the  quantity  of  solid  matter  itself  is 
irrelevant.  What  matters  are  the primary qualities,  i.e.  extension,  shape,  motion and solidity.  It 
seems, for example, that according to mechanism, a hollow globe and a solid globe would have the 
exact same mechanical properties when it comes to interactions with their environment as long as 
their primary qualities would be the same.
Thirdly, Newton claims that the cause of gravity is a cause “whose action is extended 
everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances”.45 Newton is 
stressing the fact  that while the intensity  of gravitational attraction decreases with the growing 
distance between the two attracted bodies, it never completely ceases. In this sense then, the cause 
has to be active everywhere. It is a question whether such a cause could be something mechanical.
A Divine cause of gravity
The last mentioned fact might lead us to the question whether gravity could not be caused by 
God's activity. After all, in the preceding paragraph of the General Scholium Newton claims that 
God is “always and  everywhere”.46 If God is everywhere, could he not be the cause of gravity 
“whose action is extended everywhere”?47  Newton does not explicitly embrace this hypothesis in 
the General Scholium. He in fact expresses agnosticism concerning the cause of gravity here. He, 
however, in Query 31 of the Optics claims that God can – among many other things - move physical 
bodies existing in the universe.. Here Newton characterizes God as “a powerful ever-living agent, 
who being in all places, is more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform 
sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the parts of the universe, than we are by our will to 
move the parts of our own bodies”.48
I believe Newton expresses here the Cartesian view that we have an idea of how God can 
move physical objects because we are conscious of the fact that we can by the power of our will 
move physical objects.49 From the fact that we have this ability it is reasonable to infer that God has 
44 Janiak 2004
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, p. 91.
47 Ibid., p. 92.
48 Ibid., p. 138.
49 See Gabbey 2002, p. 346.
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such an ability, only a perfect version of it. Now while this clearly is not an argument for the view 
that Newton thinks that the cause of gravity is God's activity, it shows that Newton's system allowed 
for such a possibility. It might be that Newton in the General Scholium does not explicitly mention 
this option because he would consider such a statement as feigning the hypotheses, i.e. as inferring 
more than the phenomena give us justification for.
Is gravity the kinetic behaviour of physical bodies?
There seems to be another possible interpretation of gravity. This interpretation is present in 
Clarke's fifth letter to Leibniz. According to Clarke, gravity is not an efficient cause of the kinetic 
behaviour of physical objects, it is rather this kinetic behaviour itself. Clarke claims that “by that 
term ['gravity'] we do not mean to express the cause of bodies tending towards each other, but 
barely the effect, or the phenomenon itself, and the laws or proportions of that tendency discovered 
by experience”.50 What Clarke seems to be saying here is that when we speak about gravity we are 
really  just  speaking about  the relevant  behaviour  of  the physical  objects  and the tendencies  or 
dispositions of these objects to behave in a certain – lawful – way.
Importantly, if we fix the reference of the term 'gravity' in this way, we are not committed to 
explain  what  the  physical  processes  underlying  gravity  are,  in  other  words  this  position  is 
compatible with agnosticism about the causes of the phenomena. Such agnosticism allows for the 
option that the mechanistic framework described above might be insufficient to provide the physical 
basis for gravity and indeed Clarke claims that the physical processes underlying gravity may not be 
mechanical.51
While this 'behaviourist' concept of gravity is present in Clarke's letter, it's not clear to what 
extent  we are  justified  in  ascribing  such  a  concept  to  Newton  himself.  It  is  true  that  Newton 
repeatedly expresses agnosticism regarding the cause of gravity. Famously, in the General Scholium 
Newton states that he hasn't been able to discover the cause of gravity and the reasons behind its 
properties and that he is unwilling to feign hypotheses (“hypotheses non fingo”), rejecting thereby 
all the speculations which are not deducible from the phenomena.52 Similarly,  in the Optics, he 
emphasizes  that  the  causes  of  the  forces  of  attraction  are  beyond  the  scope  of  his  interest.53 
However, I'm not sure if such agnosticism necessarily leads to the concept of force which Clarke 
seems to ascribe to Newton.54
50 Alexander 1956, p. 115.
51 Alexander 1956, p. 118.
52 Janiak 2004, p. 92.
53 Janiak 2004, p. 132. (Optics, Q. 31.)
54 Janiak (2007) argues that Clarke misinterprets Newton in the sense that Newton never held the view that gravity is 
just the phenomena and thought that gravity is the cause of the phenomena.
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Conclusion
I have thus discussed four possible interpretations of Newton's approach to gravity: the view 
that gravity is a real quality of bodies and an efficient cause of kinetic behaviour, the view that 
gravity is ultimately just the mechanical processes, the view that gravity is caused by God and the 
view that gravity is just the kinetic behaviour of physical bodies. I'm not claiming that all four 
interpretations have equally good textual support in Newton's writings, neither that Newton actually 
held  each  of  them.  It  seems  to  me  in  fact  that  it  is  somewhat  doubtful  whether  there  is  a 
straightforward answer to the question as to what characteristics Newton's concept of gravity had. 
There seem to be reasons to think that his approach to gravity underwent development and that he 
adopted various approaches for strategic reasons. Moreover, the resulting unclarity might signal the 
fact that he just was not interested in the ontological questions regarding forces, perhaps it was 
enough that the concept of force proved to be astonishingly productive when it came to uncovering 
regularities in the behaviour of objects. If this last hypothesis is correct, it moves Newton's concept 
of force close to what I will later call the instrumentalist view of force.
All these conclusions might sound a bit vague and hypothetical, however, as I stressed at the 
beginning, it  was not my intention here to decide what Newton's position was, rather to sketch 
various  possible  interpretations  of  Newton.  I  believe  such  a  general  background  will  help  us 
understand Berkeley's approach to physical forces better. It seems to me that one way to understand 
the account of force in Berkeley's De motu and in the Principles is to see Berkeley as arguing for a 
non-realist reading of Newton. In the next chapter I will try to show what reasons Berkeley had for 
preferring a non-realist concept of force.
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2. Berkeley and realism about force
I'll  now discuss Berkeley's  reaction to Newton's  dynamics.  Without  going into details  it 
might be useful to mention a few historical facts.  It seems that Berkeley was born into a very 
exciting time for someone interested in what was then called natural philosophy, physics (physica) 
or  physiology  (physiologia).55 Newton's  Principia were  first  published  in  1687,  shortly  after 
Berkeley turned two. Their second edition with the above-mentioned important additions of the 
General Scholium and Cotes's introduction were published in 1713, three years after the first edition 
of Berkeley's Principles. Berkeley's engagement with Newtonianism must have started very early in 
his philosophical career since he polemically discusses Newton's doctrine of absolute motion in his 
Notebooks which  were  probably  written  between  1706  and  1708  when  he  was  in  his  early 
twenties.56 Berkeley's general attitude towards Newton's doctrines seems to be twofold. On the one 
hand he clearly values Newton's work57,  on the other hand, however, as we have just  seen, his 
admiration is  not uncritical.  Our main concern in this  essay will  be Berkeley's approach to the 
realist view of forces, which seems to be, as I tried to show in the first chapter, one of the views that 
might be attributed to Newton. As we have seen, the second edition of Newton's Principia with its 
additions only reinforced the realist tendencies in Newton, which was something Berekeley can't 
have been too happy about.  In this  chapter I  will  discuss Berkeley's  reasons to reject dynamic 
realism while in the chapter which follows I will introduce three arguments against this doctrine 
which Berkeley presents in the Principles and in De motu.
Forces and Berkeley's immaterialism
According to Berkeley's immaterialism, the ontological view which he introduces in two of 
his early works, the Principles and the Dialogues, the whole universe consists purely of two kinds 
of entities: the perceiving minds (or spirits) and the perceived objects, ideas.58 The physical objects 
around us, such as chairs or books, are, Berkeley claims, nothing but collections or bundles of ideas. 
We can see what he means if  we look at  his  example of an apple.  According to Berkeley,  we 
observe that  certain  ideas  of  taste,  smell,  colour  and consistency  typically  appear  together  and 
therefore we treat them as a single thing – an apple. Berkeley thinks that every physical object in 
the universe is nothing but such a collection of ideas which typically appear together. 
Clearly, this might sound rather obscure. Most people would perhaps agree that when they 
55 See Gabbey 2002, p. 330.
56 See Downing 2005, p. 258, fn. 11.
57 See Principles 110.
58 Principles 1 and 2.
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perceive a physical object, they have collections of typical perceptions, but surely the perceived 
objects are distinct from these perceptions. In other words, our perceptions are commonly taken to 
represent physical objects in the world, but the very relation of representation seems to imply that 
the  perceptions  –  our  representations  -  should  not  be  identified  with  the  represented  physical 
objects.  Berkeley,  however,  in  the  two  above-mentioned  works  offers  an  ingeniously  argued 
rejection of such a view. There is certainly not enough space to go into details here, so I will just say 
that for Berkeley the existence of an unperceived and unperceivable object is self-contradictory and 
unintelligible.59 Famously, in the Dialogues Philonous encourages Hylas to try to think of an object 
existing outside the mind perceiving it, and then tries to demonstrate that any such attempt must 
necessarily  fail  (this  is  sometimes referred  to  as  Berkeley's  'master  argument').60 The  reason is 
simple: just as it is obviously contradictory to see something unseen, it is, Berkeley argues, equally 
contradictory to conceive of something unconceived. It seems to me that we can doubt whether to 
conceive of something unconceived is a clear contradiction. Even if we accept that our idea of an 
unconceived tree is itself necessarily conceived (which for Berkeley follows from the mere fact that 
it is an idea), it can, it seems to me, still have an unconceived tree as its content.61 For Berkeley 
though, conceiving of an unconceived object was a clear contradiction.  If,  however,  we cannot 
conceive of anything unconceived, then we cannot conceive of anything existing outside the mind. 
For Berkeley then only things existing  in the mind are conceivable or intelligible. Therefore, he 
argues, the physical things we perceive on an everyday basis exist only in the mind, their  esse is 
percipi.62 Since, however, the only objects that can exist in the mind are, according to Berkeley, 
ideas, it follows that physical things themselves are, strictly speaking, nothing but collections of 
ideas.
Ideas are, for Berkeley, by definition completely inert and passive63 and therefore unable to 
participate in causal chains.  This again might sound quite strange.  Surely we experience on an 
everyday basis that physical objects causally interact; fire makes wax melt and a stone can break a 
glass window. Can Berkeley account for this common sense view? He thinks that this view arises as 
a result of regularities in the flow of our ideas of sense. According to Berkeley, “when we perceive 
certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, 
we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves and make one the cause of another, 
59 Principles 3.
60 Slightly different versions of the 'master argument' are introduced in the Dialogues, pp. 183-184, and in the 
Principles 22 and 23.
61 For more on this objection and an attempt to block it see Gallois 1974.
62 Principles 3.
63 Principles 102.
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than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible”.64 It seems to me that Berkeley is saying 
here that if we observe that a certain idea always or very often appears after another one, we start 
treating the first idea as a cause and the other one as a consequence. We thus interpret the constant 
conjunction of two ideas as a case of causality and start to believe there is a necessary connection 
between  the  two  ideas.  Berkeley  thinks  that  such  an  explication  of  constant  conjunction  is 
illegitimate and misleading.65 He indeed thinks there is nothing but conjunction between ideas.66
Although I'm using Hume's term 'constant conjunction', it  should be noted that there are 
some  important  differences  between  Berkeley's  and  Hume's  account  of  causality.  While  both 
thinkers would agree that there is no necessary connection between our ideas of sense, for Hume the 
constant conjunction itself is a case of causality.67 Moreover, Berkeley's account of causality would 
not be complete if I did not mention his view that while there are strictly speaking no causes and 
effects on the physical level, he thinks the relationship between, say a lemon and sour taste in my 
mouth, is that of a sign and a thing signified.68 The relation is thus just like the linguistic relation 
between a word and its meaning: not necessary but regular and uniform.69 Berkeley then emphasizes 
that our ideas of sense, even though their occurrence is not necessary, occur in a highly lawful and 
orderly  way because  they  are  excited  by  God in  accordance  with  his  own set  of  rules  which 
Berkeley calls the 'laws of nature'.70
Is there then no place for causality in the Berkeleian universe at all? Such a conclusion 
would be incorrect since Berkeley thinks there is causality between spirits and ideas in the sense 
that spirits are efficient causes of ideas. Ideas of sense are caused by the Eternal Spirit – God, while 
ideas of imagination are caused by 'human' spirits.71
The efficient cause of the observed changes in motion as well as other changes of physical 
bodies  is  thus  always the activity  of  God.  Therefore  it  seems that  Berkeley's  immaterialism is 
inconsistent with realism about forces. In my definition of dynamic realism in the previous chapter I 
stated that this  view implies that  forces are efficient causes of changes  in kinetic behaviour of 
physical bodies. If Berkeley's immaterialism is correct though, this seems impossible and realism is 
thus ruled out.
64 Principles 32.
65 Principles 32.
66 Principles 31.
67 Enquiry VII. 29.
68 Principles 65.
69 I will say more about Berkeley's concept of the Divine language in the last chapter of my essay.
70 Principles 30.
71 Principles 102.
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Forces in Berkeley's epistemology
I will now discuss the relationship between dynamic realism and Berkeley's epistemological 
views. I will thus address the question whether we have in Berkeley's view cognitive access to 
realistically conceived forces. My question here is then whether dynamic realism is compatible with 
Berkeley's epistemology.
In the first paragraph of the Principles Berkeley talks about the objects of human knowledge 
and for a reader of Locke's  Essay Berkeley's list must sound familiar. Berkeley distinguishes here 
between three kinds of ideas, ideas of sense,  ideas “perceived by attending to the passions and 
operations of the mind” and ideas of memory and imagination.72 If  we understand Berkeley as 
saying that the objects of our knowledge are only ideas, we need to ask whether we can have an 
idea of a force. It seems to me that Berkeley would give a negative answer to that question. I will 
now describe Berkley's reasons for such an answer.
The first reason, explored mainly in Berkeley's De motu, an essay published in 1721, consists 
of  the  view that  in  our  sense  experience  we don't  encounter  forces  but  only  their  effects  and 
therefore we cannot get an idea of force from our senses. All the phenomena we perceive, such as 
motion of bodies or our feeling of fatigue when we carry heavy objects, are effects of forces. We 
therefore when it comes to the natural world never perceive forces themselves.73 The realistically 
conceived  forces,  even  if  they  existed,  would  be  unperceived  and unperceivable  causes  of  the 
sensible phenomena.74  Such a conclusion, however, makes their very existence deeply problematic 
in  Berkeley's  system,  since  Berkeley  thinks  that  we  cannot  conceive  of  an  object  that  is 
unperceived, that exists outside the mind.
It seems to me that someone might raise the following objection against this view: perhaps 
Berkeley is right that we only have sensual access to the effects of forces, but we can infer that there 
is a cause of these sensible effects and we can get the idea of force by abstracting from all the 
sensible effects. 
Berkeley must have expected such an objection because in the passage where he introduces 
the concept of force as a cause inaccessible to our senses, he warns his readers against employing 
abstract terms in meditation.75 It seems to me that Berkeley would deny the option that we can get 
an abstract idea of force. Let me now state my reason for this claim. When Berkeley discusses 
abstract ideas in the Introduction to the Principles, he rejects the option that we can frame various 
abstract ideas, such as the idea of a particular colour abstracted from other ideas such as extension 
72 Principles 1.
73 De motu 4.
74 For a different interpretation of Berkeley according to which we get ideas of forces from our sense of touch see 
Palkoska 2009, p. 212.
75 De motu 4.
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or shape, on the grounds that he cannot imagine colour without any extension or shape at all.76 It 
seems then that his view is that we cannot have an idea of x if we cannot imagine x. If I'm right in 
ascribing this criterion to Berkeley, it seems to me that he would have to reject the possibility that 
we might have an idea of force, since we certainly cannot imagine force itself without any of its 
sensible effects. Any attempt at imagining force must necessarily end up by imagining the effects of 
it.  The  option  of  arriving  at  the  idea  of  force  by  means  of  abstraction  then  seems  closed  for 
Berkeley. I have thus described one reason why we cannot have an idea of force. The second reason 
consists in the way Berkeley characterizes ideas.
As we saw, in Berkeley's view ideas are completely inactive in the sense that they cannot 
cause any changes in other ideas or in themselves. In Berkeley's words “there is nothing of Power 
or  Agency included in  them”.77 Realistically  understood forces,  on the other  hand,  seem to be 
essentially active. They are, after all, conceived as real causes of motion and attraction. Berkeley 
thinks that the very fact that forces are active makes it impossible for us to frame an idea of force. 
The reason for this is Berkeley's principle that an idea - as something essentially passive or inert - 
cannot  represent  anything active.78 If,  however,  we cannot  frame ideas  of  forces,  our  cognitive 
access to them might seem to be problematic.
Why can't there be, according to Berkeley, an idea of something active? Berkeley thinks that 
the validity of this principle can be revealed to anyone who attempts to frame such an idea. It seems 
to me that this principle is valid as long as we see an idea as an image or a mental picture while it 
might be more controversial to think an idea is more like a concept. I think Berkeley might be right 
that  a  completely  passive  and  inert  mental  picture  can  hardly  represent  an  activity.  Berkeley 
considers  this  principle  to  be evident.  Do we then in  Berkeley's  view have no epistemological 
access to forces whatsoever? Such a conclusion would be too hasty because in Berkeley's view we 
can know of things which we do not have ideas of. Our knowledge is for Berkeley not exhausted by 
our possession of ideas.
A notion of an active power
Berkeley's view that we can have knowledge of entities which we do not have ideas of is 
revealed whenever he talks about spirits or minds. Spirits are for Berkeley the only substances in 
the universe and they are essentially active,  perceiving beings which ideas exist in.79 Now, one 
might wonder how can we know all this about spirits if, as we saw, we cannot have an idea of 
76 Introduction 7 and 10.
77 Principles 25.
78 Principles 27.
79 Principles 2.
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anything active.80
Berkeley is not very explicit about this, but it seems that his view is that our knowledge of 
spirits is based on what he calls a 'notion' of a spirit.81 The term 'notion' in this technical sense 
wasn't used in the first edition of the  Principles published in 1710. It first appeared only in the 
second edition,  published in  1734.82 Berkeley's  doctrine  of  notions  roots  from certain  semantic 
considerations. Berkeley accepts Locke's view that what makes some (not all) words meaningful is 
the fact that they stand for ideas.83 Nouns like 'tree' or 'chair' then are significant because they stand 
for ideas. Such an explanation, however, creates a problem with the significance of words standing 
for minds (such as 'mind', 'spirit' or 'soul') and their operations (such as 'perceiving' or 'willing').84 
Since Berkeley claims that we do not have ideas of minds and their operations, these words might 
seem to lack significance and therefore be meaningless.  However,  as  Berkeley emphasizes,  we 
understand these words. I believe Berkeley tries to solve this tension by the concept of notion used 
in a technical sense. In an important passage added to the second edition of the Principles, Berkeley 
claims that “it must be owed at the same time that we have some  notion  of soul, spirit, and the 
operations of the mind […] inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words”.85 It 
seems that he is suggesting that  mind-words are meaningful because they stand for or represent 
notions.
It might be objected that the doctrine of notions creates a problem for Berkeley's metaphysical 
commitments. One of the pillars of his metaphysics, as we saw, is the view that there are only two 
kinds of things in the universe: the perceiving minds and the perceived ideas.86 Since notions cannot 
be classified as either of these, they might seem to be rather mysterious.
I  think Berkeley would  reject  the  possibility  that  notions  are a  kind of  things  or  objects 
though. My reason for thinking that is  that the main example of a notion is  our knowledge of 
ourselves, of our own minds, and Berkeley never says that we know our own mind via a kind of 
object which represents it to us. On the contrary, he seems to think that our knowledge of ourselves 
is not mediated by anything. In the Third Dialogue Philonous claims: “I know what I mean by the 
terms I and myself; and I know this immediately, or intuitively”.87 It seems then that Berkeley's term 
'notion' could be referring to the bare fact of knowledge or acquaintance or perhaps to something 
like direct self-consciousness. It is no coincidence that in De motu Berkeley says that we know our 
80 Principles 27.
81 Principles 27.
82 Woozley 1976, p. 428.
83 Essay III. 1. 2.
84 Woozley 1976, p. 430.
85 Principles p. 78.
86 Principles 89.
87 Dialogues p. 221.
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own minds “by a certain inner consciousness” (conscientia quadam interna).88
If we thus have a notion of our own mind and its operations, and our mind is something 
essentially active, shouldn't we say that we also get a notion of active power from reflection on the 
activities of our mind? I think the answer to this question should be positive. I will now try to 
explain why I think it is reasonable to believe that we can in Berkeley's system have a notion of an 
active power based on what we know about our own minds.
Berkeley observes that our faculty of imagination enables us to willingly excite ideas in our 
minds89 and that minds have a power to move bodies90. My mind then can be an efficient cause of 
an occurrence of an idea. If I want to start imagining the Eiffel Tower right now, I can. If I do so, 
the occurrence of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower will be caused by my mind itself and by 
imagining it I experience or am conscious of a certain power of my own mind – a causal power to 
operate with ideas at will. It seems that Berkeley would say that all this is something we just know 
about our minds. However, since we have no ideas of these powers of the mind, it is, I believe, 
reasonable to think that we know these things by means of notions. It seems then that we have a 
notion of an active power of the mind. This conclusion is confirmed in a passage in the Principles 
quoted above, where Berkeley says that we have a notion of the operations of the mind and gives 
willing (the activity of will) as an example of such an operation.91 I have thus cognitive access to an 
active power of my own mind, even though I do not get this access through sense experience.
As we saw, physical force, considered realistically seems to be a certain causal power of one 
physical object to affect another object. I have already mentioned that this seems to be, for example, 
Locke's view of force. It seems then that our notion of active power is in a sense a notion of force, 
even though a notion of spiritual force rather than physical force. Since Berkeley admits that we 
have a notion of an active power, we might ask whether this notion could not give us cognitive 
access to physical forces. If it were so, it would seem that Berkeley's epistemological views are 
actually fully compatible with dynamic realism. However, I think Berkeley would reject such an 
option and I will  now try to explain why I believe that our concept of active power cannot be 
extended to the sphere of physical bodies.
A good way to elucidate the problem might be to contrast Berkeley's view with the view of 
John Locke. According to Locke, we can acquire a clear and distinct idea of active power from 
reflection on the operations of our minds.92 I observe that I can move my hand, for example, by 
merely deciding to do so and thus I discover that my mind has the ability to start a motion, i.e. it has 
88 De motu 21.
89 Principles 28.
90 De motu 25.
91 Principles 27.
92 Essay II. 21. 4.
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active power. The idea I acquire in this way can then, according to Locke, be extended to physical 
bodies. Similarly, Berkeley claims that our faculty of imagination enables us to willingly excite 
ideas in our minds93 and he claims that we have some notion of force based on our experience of 
this.94 It might seem plausible then to say – with Locke – that this notion of active power can be 
extended to physical bodies.
For Berkeley, however, such an option is ruled out because he, as we have seen, thinks that 
physical objects are ultimately nothing but collections of ideas and ideas are utterly inert and have 
therefore  no  powers  whatsoever.  Berkeley  would  then  clearly  reject  any  attempts  at  ascribing 
activity or agency to physical bodies.95 It  seems then that dynamic realism is incompatible with 
Berkeley's epistemological views. Even though we do have a notion of active power, we cannot 
extend this notion to physical objects and therefore it seems that we do not have any cognitive 
access to physical forces.96
I have thus tried to show why both Berkeley's metaphysics and Berkeley's epistemology are 
incompatible with dynamic realism. I believe these tensions were the main reasons why Berkeley 
rejects dynamic realism. While these reasons were surely serious for him, one might doubt that they 
were taken too seriously by a reader who does not embrace Berkeley's immaterialism. Therefore in 
the next chapter I will talk about Berkeley's arguments that were meant to motivate other thinkers, 
who did not necessarily share Berkeley's metaphysical views, to abandon dynamic realism.
93 Principles 28.
94 De motu 25
95 Berkeley offers some reasons for this restriction independent of the validity of immaterialism in De motu. I will 
mention some of these reasons in the following chapter.
96 I will return to this point in the next chapter and there I will try to evaluate its plausibility.
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3. Berkeley's arguments against dynamic realism
I will now discuss three arguments that Berkeley uses to motivate his readers to abandon the 
realist view of forces. In a sense, of course, we could see his whole immaterialist project introduced 
in the  Principles and in the   Dialogues  as an argument against dynamic realism since it implies 
passivity of physical bodies. I have, however, mentioned the problem of forces in immaterialism in 
the previous section of my essay and I won't return to it  here. Instead I will focus on three of 
Berkeley's arguments against dynamic realism whose soundness does not depend on the correctness 
if immaterialism.
Argument from ignorance
The  first  of  these  arguments  is  stated  in  Berkeley's  Principles.97 Berkeley  remarks  that 
physicists explain various natural phenomena, such as the descent of bodies or the movement of the 
moon, by the concept of attraction and he asks “how are we enlightened by being told this is done 
by attraction?”.98 To answer the question simply, he thinks we are not enlightened at all, because 
physics tells us nothing about what kind of forces actually cause the phenomena and where these 
forces are placed. He notices that when a physicist speaks of gravity, “[...] nothing is determined of 
the manner of action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed 'impulse', or 'protrusion', as 
'attraction'.99 Berkeley then thinks that since physics keeps us utterly ignorant about how and where 
forces act, it doesn't matter which of the terms we use. We, for example, observe the fall of a stone 
towards  the  ground  and  we  have,  according  to  Berkeley,  based  on  what  we  know  from  the 
phenomena no reason to prefer the view that there are attractive forces in both bodies which attract 
the two bodies towards each other to the view that there are 'pushing' forces of protrusion outside 
the bodies pushing the two bodies towards each other. The kinetic phenomena themselves reveal 
nothing about the “manner of action” and therefore give us no reason to prefer  either of these 
views. Therefore, if a dynamic realist claims that attractive forces are qualities of the bodies, his 
claim lacks justification.
Is Berkeley's argument persuasive? It seems to me that the first thing that needs to be said is 
that the argument doesn't show that  any version of dynamic realism has to be wrong, it merely 
shows that we lack a criterion which would enable us to decide which version is the correct one. 
Berkeley thus,  I  think,  manages to  show that  the version of  dynamic realism which postulates 
97 Principles 103.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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attractive forces in the bodies, is just one player in the game and not the only player.
It seems to me that we can also understand Berkeley in this passage as warning us against 
being misled by language. If the physicists talk about 'attraction', it surely seem as if they are talking 
about some determinate hidden real qualities or processes hidden behind the observable phenomena 
and  causing  them.  However,  as  we have  seen,  such  a  belief  is  utterly  unjustified  because  the 
physicists do not see what is behind the phenomena any more than we do.100 This is, I believe, why 
Berkeley claims that the term 'attraction' signifies nothing but the observable effects, i.e. not the 
cause, but the caused phenomena. If we accept such a 'surface'  view, we will not be misled by 
language any more.
Argument from different views
Berkeley offers another argument against dynamic realism in a widely-discussed passage of 
De motu.101 Here Berkeley  observes  that  even  though different  thinkers  say  very different  and 
sometimes contrary things  about  forces,  many of them “attain  the truth”.  From this  it  is  clear, 
Berkeley thinks, that “force is not a thing certain and determinate”. He then offers an alternative 
view of force. He claims that “forces attributed to bodies are mathematical hypotheses [...]. But 
mathematical entities have no stable essence in the nature of things; and they depend on the notion 
of the definer”102 Berkeley seems to be making an interesting point here. He asks how it is possible 
that people holding conflicting views of forces still manage to arrive at truths about the world and 
he answers that it is because force is not a certain and determinate thing. 
It seems to me that we can elucidate the structure of this argument if we imagine what a 
realist opponent of Berkeley might say to defend his view. A realist opponent might, I think, reply 
that the fact that different thinkers have different views of forces can be explained by the fact that 
some of these views are simply wrong. At the same time though, these thinkers with opposing 
views are able to discover the truths about the world. This must be because they are not wrong 
about any of the important features of force. Even though then thinkers hold a lot of wrong views 
about  force,  force  still  helps  them calculate  correct  predictions  about  the  world  and formulate 
correct physical laws. Berkeley thinks that the wrong views concerning force root from the idea that 
force is a determinate thing, something really existing out there in the world. As I tried to show 
earlier in this essay, such a realist commitment leads to a lot of problems concerning the ontological 
characteristics of forces. Even though then thinkers struggle with these ontological features of force, 
they are still able to use force in calculations if they consider it as a mathematical concept.
100Principles 105.
101De motu, 67.
102Ibid.
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Does Berkeley give us a good reason to reject dynamic realism? It seems to me that while 
this argument can work as a motivation for us to approach force as a mathematical concept rather 
than as something which has real existence in the world, it, strictly speaking, doesn't rule out that 
forces might be real entities in the world. Of course, one explanation of the varying opinions of 
thinkers  when  it  comes  to  force  is  that  forces  do  not  exist  at  all.  However,  there  are  other 
explanations. Perhaps forces are just entities which somehow show us the limits of the traditional 
metaphysics with its substance – accident dichotomy. In other words, perhaps forces really exist but 
for some reason resist the attempts of philosophers to describe them in the terms of the traditional 
metaphysics and that's why the opinions of various thinkers concerning forces vary a great deal and 
are sometimes contradictory.
Did Berkeley hold the underdetermination of theory by data thesis?
Berkeleian scholars have payed a lot of attention to a claim Berkeley makes in this passage. 
We saw that the above-mentioned argument is based on the claim that there are many different 
thinkers with many different opinions about forces. Berkeley uses the examples of Torricelli and 
Newton to show what he means. He discusses some differences between their (incompatible) views 
and then he remarks: “But although Newton and Torricelli seem to be disagreeing with one another, 
they each advance consistent views, and the thing is sufficiently well explained by both.”103
Based on this remark and the passage discussed Berkeley's first argument (Principles 103), 
some commentators have attributed to Berkeley the view that has been made famous by Quine, 
Duhem and other twentieth century thinkers as the 'underdetermination of theory by data thesis' 
(hereafter  cited as 'underdetermination thesis).104 The underdetermination thesis is a view in the 
philosophy of science that “for any subject matter there will be a pair of evidentially equivalent 
theories which are logically incompatible”.105 Two theories are evidentially equivalent if they meet 
the  following two conditions.  Firstly,  no possible  observation or  test  can confirm one of  them 
without  confirming the  other  or  disconfirm one without  disconfirming the  other.  Secondly,  the 
theories are equally “good” in the sense that whatever we decide to use as a criterion for theory 
choice (such as simplicity, the range of explained phenomena etc.) the two theories fare equally 
well.
The underdetermination thesis, if true, is itself an argument against scientific realism. Let me 
explain why. If two theories are logically incompatible, they posit different theoretical entities, or 
we could say that the theoretical sentences of the two theories contradict each other. However, there 
103De motu 67.
104Newton-Smith 1985, p. 155-156.
105Ibid., p. 156.
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is no empirical test available to decide which of the two competing theories is true. Therefore there 
is no way to decide whether the theoretical sentences of each of the theories are true and that's why 
we should treat all the theoretical entities posited by the theories (such as gravity, force of field) as 
mere theoretical hypotheses. This, however, rules out realist view of theoretical entities.
Does Berkeley really use the underdetermination thesis (or perhaps some primitive version 
of it) as an argument against dynamic realism? I think our evidence for the view that he does is 
rather weak. It is true that Berkeley says that when it comes to dynamism, there exist two theories 
which  are  incompatible,  but  arrive  at  truths  anyway.  Also,  Berkeley  says  that  “the  thing  is 
sufficiently well explained by both”. Moreover, in the above-discussed passage from the Principles 
he claims that based on the phenomena there is no way to decide which of the two theories (the 
'protrusion  theory'  or  the  'attraction  theory')  is  correct.106 However,  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
underdetermination thesis is much stronger than this.107 Firstly, there should be two evidentially 
equivalent, yet logically incompatible theories for any subject matter. There is no reason, it seems to 
me, to think that Berkeley held such a view. Also, Berkeley never says that there could be no 
criterion which would show that one of the theories is more useful (perhaps such a criterion might 
be simplicity).
For these reasons I'm not quite sure whether Berkeley really holds the underdetermination 
thesis and uses it to argue against dynamic realism. It seems to me that if he did hold a view similar 
to the underdetermination thesis, he would have stated this view at more length than in two short 
passages.
Semantic argument 
According to Lisa Downing, Berkeley offers another argument against dynamic realism in De 
motu. The argument is supposed to show that the terms used by dynamic realists are meaningless 
because they do not refer to anything.108 Downing's reconstruction of the argument goes like this: if 
force-terms  (i.e.  words  like  'force'  or  'gravity')  are  supposed  to  be  meaningful,  there  must  be 
something which they refer to. However, we don't have sensory access to forces. Therefore, “the 
term  'force'  is  empty  of  any  significance  adequate  to  secure  reference”.109 If  we  express  the 
argument in this way, it might seem that it presupposes that the only kind of significance adequate 
to secure reference is sensory significance. However, the validity of this principle is dubious.
Let  me therefore  describe  the  argument  in  more  detail.  Berkeley  claims in  De motu and 
106Principles 103.
107I thus agree with Downing's criticism of Newton-Smith's interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy of science. See 
Downing 1995, p. 211.
108Downing 1995, p. 212.
109Downing 1995, p. 205.
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elsewhere that based on what we observe about physical bodies, we have no reason to think that we 
can ascribe to them physical forces as their qualities. After all, all the sensible qualities of bodies do 
not seem to be active in any way.110 If we consider extension, shape, color or any other observed 
qualities of bodies, they all seem to be utterly passive. Berkeley claims that “[i]f therefore by the 
term body be meant that which we conceive, obviously the principle of motion cannot be sought 
therein”.111 Our senses then give us no knowledge of any active powers of bodies, including forces. 
We  should  notice  that  this  is  an  epistemological  claim  and  it  is  therefore  different  from  the 
ontological claim made in the Principles stating that bodies are bundles of ideas and therefore by 
definition inactive.
As I tried to show in the previous chapter, Berkeley thinks that we have a notion of active 
power  from  the  capacity,  which  he  calls  reflection  or  intellect,  a  notion  based  on  inner 
consciousness  of  the  operations  of  our  own  mind.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  this  notion  is, 
according  to  Berkeley,  not  extendable  to  physical  bodies.  I  also  discussed  a  reason  why  for 
Berkeley such an extension is impossible – the utmost inertness of our ideas.
Berkeley notices that dynamic realists commonly use force-terms and claim that they refer to 
some real qualities of bodies. If, however, Berkeley is right that we cannot apply our notion of 
active power to physical bodies it seems that force-terms lack all reference securing significance 
and  are  therefore  empty.  Although  this  might  sound  rather  technical,  the  thought  behind  the 
argument does not seem to be complicated. We saw that Berkeley shares Locke's view that some 
words (such as many nouns) are meaningful because they stand for ideas. We saw that with words 
like 'mind' or 'spirit' the situation is different, they are, in Berkeley's view, made meaningful by our 
possession of relevant notions.112 This, however, brings in the question on the basis of what are 
force-terms meaningful. We have seen that since Berkeley thinks that forces are not observable, 
force-terms cannot stand for ideas. There is though still the option that they could stand for notions, 
especially since we have a notion of spiritual force. However, since this notion is not, according to 
Berkeley, applicable to physical bodies, it cannot provide significance to the term 'physical force'. 
This  rejection,  however,  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  force  terms  are  utterly  meaningless  and 
dynamic realism is therefore deeply problematic.
I will now try to decide to what extent is Berkeley's argument, as reconstructed by Downing, 
persuasive. The most problematic point of the argument seems to be Berkeley's epistemological 
restriction that  even though we have – through our  faculty  of  reflection – some knowledge (a 
notion) of active power, this knowledge cannot give significance to force-terms because our notion 
110De motu 29.
111Ibid.
112See Principles 27.
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of active power cannot be extended to physical bodies. We have seen that if we accept Berkeley's 
view  that  our  ideas  are  utterly  inert,  such  an  extension  is  ruled  out.  According  to  Downing, 
Berkeley tries to offer independent justification for the impossibility of this extension in  De motu 
because the essay was written for readers who Berkeley could not expect to share his immaterialist 
views.113 Indeed,  De motu  was submitted to  a  competition organized by the Paris  Academy of 
Sciences and Berkeley could expect the judges to have generally Cartesian views.114 What reasons 
does  then  Berkeley  give us  for  the  view that  we cannot  extend our  notion of  active  power to 
physical bodies? 
Firstly, Berkeley talks about the very limited scope of the faculty of reflection (intellect).115 
Berkeley claims that the intellect is “concerned only with spiritual and unextended things, such as 
our minds, their states, passions, virtues, and such like”.116 If we thus have our notion of active 
power from the intellect and the intellect deals exclusively with spirits, than the notion of active 
power has to stay in the realm of spirits. As Downing emphasizes, however, Berkeley doesn't give 
us a reason why the activities of the intellect are restricted in this way.
The second reason why the notion of active power cannot be extended to physical bodies, is 
Berkeley's  view that  the spirits  and bodies  are  utterly  heterogeneous.  In  De motu 30 Berkeley 
reports Anaxagoras's view that mind and body have nothing in common. If then minds have active 
power and Anaxagoras's view is correct, it is automatically ruled out that bodies could have active 
power. The controversial premise of this argument is the view that there is an absolute heterogeneity 
between minds and bodies. Again, Berkeley doesn't offer an argument for this heterogeneity in De 
motu.
These  are  then  two  reasons,  which  Downing  suggests  Berkeley  can  use  to  justify  the 
epistemological restriction. I agree with Downing that these reasons offer only limited justification 
for the epistemological restriction. Downing then tries to support Berkeley's argument by bringing 
in  Berkeley's  antiabstractionism.117 While  in  the  published  version  of  the  Introduction  to  the 
Principles,  Berkeley  attacks  the  view  that  we  possess  abstract  ideas,  in  the  first  draft  of  this 
Introduction  his  argument  is  stronger  –  it  problematizes  our  possession  of  abstract  concepts  in 
113Downing 2005, p. 237.
114This is one explanation of the fact that some passages in De motu have a dualist, broadly Cartesian character (e.g. 
De motu 21). Another explanation of this fact is that Berkeley - at least partially - gave up his metaphysical views. 
After all, De motu was published in 1721, more than a decade after the Principles and eight years after the 
Dialogues. In this essay I will presuppose that the first explanation is correct and that Berkeley just was not explicit 
about his immaterialism in De motu for strategic reasons.
115It is enough for my purposes to say that Berkeley means by 'intellect' in De motu rougly the same as what he means 
by 'reflection' in the Principles.
116De motu 53.
117Downing 1995, p. 208.
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general. Berkeley claims here that “an impossibility cannot be conceiv'd”.118 Berkeley seems to be 
arguing here that whatever cannot exist separately, cannot even be conceived as existing separately. 
Therefore, because the causal activity of our mind cannot exist separately from our mind, we cannot 
even conceive of it in abstraction and apply this concept to physical bodies.
Just to summarize: firstly, our faculty of reflection only deals with spirits and therefore cannot 
extend its notions to physical bodies, its notions cannot be be mixed with the ideas from our senses. 
Secondly, bodies and souls are completely heterogeneous and cannot share any qualities or powers 
and thirdly, the option that we could abstract the notion of the mind's active power from the notion 
of the mind as a whole seems to conflict with Berkeley's anti-abstractionist views.
It seems to me that Downing offers an interesting attempt to reconstruct one of Berkeley's 
arguments. I do, however, agree with her that the persuasiveness of this argument is limited. It 
seems to  me that a  thinker who disagrees  with immaterialism might  easily  criticize the above-
mentioned epistemological restriction and Berkeley doesn't seem to be able to offer a persuasive 
support for this restriction. I'm also not sure whether bringing in Berkley's antiabstractionism helps 
the argument very much, since it is not clear whether Berkley's target reader would accept this 
doctrine.
118First draft, p. 125.
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4. Berkeley's concept of force
After focusing mainly on the negative part of Berkeley's approach to dynamics, namely his 
criticism of dynamic realism, I would now like to move to its positive part and talk about Berkeley's 
own view of physical forces. It seems to me that a superficial reader of Berkeley's early works 
might  be  tempted  to  wonder  why  Berkeley  didn't  just  reject  the  existence  of  physical  forces 
altogether. After all, immaterialism rules out any kind of causality between physical bodies.
The main reason might be that Berkeley highly valued Newton's work119 and was aware that 
Newton's laws of motion and his theory of gravitational attraction can be used to show that the flow 
of our ideas of sense is regular and orderly.120 It was this regularity and order in the flow of our 
ideas of sense which was an important premise in Berkeley's argument for the existence of God.121 
According to Berkeley, it is  the “constant regularity, order and concatenation of natural things” 
which is a clear sign of the existence God, the author of this natural order. If natural philosophy is a 
discipline which reveals this order and which shows us the regularities in nature, it clearly had to 
play a very important role in the Berkeleian universe. However, no matter how important the role of 
natural philosophy is, its role is, according to Berkeley, also in important aspects restricted. What 
role did Berkeley then ascribe to natural philosophy?
Berkeley's view of physical explanation
The  role  of  natural  philosophy,122 according  to  Berkeley,  is  to  reveal  regularities  in  the 
phenomena,  not  to  discover  the  efficient  causes  of  the  phenomena.  Berkeley  claims  that  the 
difference between a layman and a natural philosopher consists  not  in the fact  that the natural 
philosopher would know more about the efficient causes of the phenomena but in the fact that a 
natural philosopher has a greater understanding of the phenomena themselves.123 The reason for 
such a restriction of the realm of natural philosophy was simple: Berkeley thought that describing 
the causes of natural phenomena is exclusively the business of metaphysics. Berkeley explicitly 
states this  restriction in  De motu  when he says that  “metaphysical  principles  and real  efficient 
causes of motion and existence of bodies or of corporeal attributes in no way belong to mechanics 
or experiment nor throw light on them, except [...] they may serve to define the limits of physics”.124
This  understanding  of  physics  might  naturally  lead  us  to  the  question  what  kind  of 
explanation can physics, thus restricted, provide. In order to answer this question it might help to 
119Principles 110.
120Principles 146.
121Principles 146.
122In the following text I will use the terms 'physics' and 'natural philosophy' interchangebly.
123Principles 105.
124De motu 41.
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contrast this understanding of physics with a more traditional one. As we saw, in Berkeley's time 
the prevalent scientific paradigm was that of mechanism. In mechanism to explain a phenomenon 
means roughly to show what its efficient causes are.125 If we understand how exactly a certain 
phenomenon is caused, we understand that the phenomenon happened necessarily.126 As we said 
though,  according  to  Berkeley,  this  kind  of  explanation  is  in  principle  unavailable  to  physics, 
because there are no necessary connections, no cases of causality on the physical level.
Berkeley none the less thinks that physics can provide a sort of explanation of a phenomenon 
by showing that it happens in a regular or orderly way. The role of physics is then to uncover the 
rules  according  to  which  phenomena  appear,  to  uncover  the  laws  of  nature.127 The  kind  of 
explanation that  belongs to  the realm of physics “consists  only in showing the conformity any 
particular phenomenon hath to  the general Laws of Nature”.128 However,  it  might seem that  to 
understand that a phenomenon is a part of a regular pattern doesn't always mean that we have an an 
explanation of the phenomenon. If I, for example, observe that the sun rises every morning, I still 
seem to lack the explanation of why it happens. My conclusion that the sun rises every morning is a 
result of an inductive inference based on my observation of many mornings in which the sun rose. It 
seems, however, that this inductive inference has not brought us much closer to the explanation of 
the phenomenon itself.
It is important to keep in mind the difference between a mere regularity and a law of nature. 
While by inductive inference we always arrive at a regularity, we don't always arrive at a law of 
nature.  Unlike  a  mere  regularity,  a  law  of  nature  has  to  be  universal.  My  above-mentioned 
conclusion that the sun rises every morning can turn out to be wrong if one morning the sun doesn't 
rise. A law of nature, however, as long as it is a real law of nature cannot turn out to be wrong. If it 
did we would be inclined to say that it  wasn't  a law of nature.  It  seems that in the Principles  
Berkeley  wasn't  fully  aware  of  this  difference.129 In  section  30  of  the  Principles,  for  example, 
Berkeley  says  that  we learn  the  laws  of  nature  from experience.  However,  it  seems that  what 
scientists do is much more than learning from experience. In De motu, on the other hand, Berkeley 
seems more aware of this difference. He claims here that what mechanical philosophers discover 
are the basic, general and simple principles “which have been proved by experiments, elaborated by 
reason and rendered universal”.130 The laws discovered by physicists,  such as Newton's laws of 
125Dancy 1987, p. 97.
126For more on mechanical explanation and its contrast with the traditional - scholastic view of explanation see 
Palkoska 2009, pp. 191-194.
127Principles 30.
128Principles 62.
129See Downing 2005, p. 249.
130De motu 36.
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motion, are then clearly not mere observed regularities.
Does  this  specification  help  to  make  the  view  that  a  phenomenon  can  be  explained  by 
showing its conformity with a law of nature more persuasive? It might seem that it doesn't because 
we are still missing the essential part, the knowledge why a particular law of nature is valid. We 
still, in other words, seem to lack the feeling of necessity which a mechanical explanation is able to 
evoke. If we are, for example, told that the movement of the moon can be explained by the law 
according to which, roughly speaking, any two physical bodies attract each other, we still lack the 
knowledge how and why this happens, we still want to know more. Even if physics cannot tell us 
the whole story, we want to at least have a sort of hope that the causes of the phenomena can be 
discovered and the phenomena be can be shown as necessary. According to Berkeley, however, by 
discovering  the  particular  law  of  nature  we  have  reached  the  limits  of  physics.  There  is  an 
explanation  why  the  laws  of  nature  are  valid,  but  this  explanation  belongs  to  the  realm  of 
metaphysics. This last explanation will be an appeal to the will and wisdom of God.
According to Berkeley, the discovered laws of nature do not pick out necessary connections 
between phenomena. Berkeley, however, does not consider this to be a weakness of his philosophy 
of science for at least three reasons. Firstly, he would probably say that the feeling of necessity we 
get  from mechanical  explanations  is  nothing  but  an  illusion.  As  his  immaterialism shows,  the 
occurrence of the effects  which mechanism sees  as  fully  necessitated by the occurrence of  the 
causes,  is  in  fact  wholly  dependent  on  the  will  of  God  and  therefore  there  is  no  necessary 
connection between the physical causes and effects.
Secondly, Berkeley thinks that once we accept that God is the only efficient cause of all the 
phenomena we can see the whole world as a sort text written by God for us in which the ideas of 
sense are words in God's language. According to Berkeley then, immaterialism leads to the view 
that all our sense perceptions are signs which God uses to talk to us. Now, this might sound rather 
obscure, let me therefore explore this view in more detail.
Physics as linguistics
A certain form of this view appeared already in the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision  
(1709), Berkeley's first published work. Berkeley claims here that our visual ideas are signs which 
inform us about tangible objects and thus enable us to avoid various dangers and, on the other hand, 
find the things we need for our survival. Berkeley claims here that “the proper objects of vision 
constitute  an universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate 
our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of 
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our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them”.131
In the Principles, Berkeley seems to embrace a more general version of this view when he 
claims that all our sense perceptions are marks or signs of other sense perceptions.132 He illustrates 
his point with a few examples:  “The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer, but the 
mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that 
motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof.”133 The relation between the open 
fire and my burned hand or between the coffee in the cup and the bitter taste in my mouth is then 
for Berkeley not the relation between a cause and effect but rather a relation between a sign and the 
thing signified. Importantly, there is clearly no necessary connection between a sign and the thing 
signified. There is no way I could find out from a word of an unknown language what the word 
signifies just by investigation of the word itself. For Berkeley, however, the same thing and events 
is  true  for  objects  in  the  physical  world,  I  cannot  discover  the  effect  of  one  event  just  by 
investigating this event because the connection between the cause and the event is not necessary. It 
is, on the contrary, arbitrary and I can therefore only learn it from experience.
This conception of physical reality gives physics a highly noble task: by discovering the 
laws of nature it discovers the grammatical rules of the divine language.134 Importantly, just like few 
people would say that the rules of grammar do not explain our language usage because the relations 
between language units are not necessary, we should not think that physicists do not explain the 
natural world just because they do not discover necessary connections between things and events.
The third reason why Berkeley would claim that the fact that physics does not discover 
necessary connections should not be seen as a weakness of physics is his highly pragmatic approach 
to physics and science in general. Even though physics does not discover necessary connections, it 
can be very useful to us in the conduct of our everyday life because it enables us to make correct 
predictions of the phenomena.135 In other words, in everyday life we do not need to know that A 
causes B as long as we know that B always happens in conjunction with A.
Force as a useful tool
 Since Berkeley for reasons mentioned above did not want to claim that forces do not exist at 
all, he had to look for an interpretation of physical concepts such as force or gravity which would 
do the desired explanatory job without the undesirable ontological commitments, namely a concept 
which would avoid the inconsistencies with idealism described in chapter two. Berkeley tries to 
131New Theory 147.
132Principles 65.
133Principles 65.
134Principles 66, 108.
135See e.g. Alciphron VII. 7.
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offer such a concept in De motu.
At first sight it might seem that there is a certain tension between various things Berkeley says 
about physical forces. He puts forward two different characteristics of force. In various passages he 
identifies force with the observable kinetic  phenomena while  elsewhere he claims that  force is 
merely  a  mathematical  hypothesis.  I  would  like  to  tackle  the  question  whether  these  two 
characteristics are logically compatible.
Force as the kinetic phenomena
The  first  of  these  characteristics  can  be  found  in  the  already  quoted  section  102  of  the 
Principles and in various sections of De motu. In these passages Berkeley seems to be saying that 
the terms 'force' or 'attraction' refer to the kinetic phenomena themselves, i.e. to certain features of 
the observable physical behaviour  of the bodies.  It  seems to me that  the general  tone of these 
passages is roughly reductionist. Force is reducible to the observable behaviour in the sense that 
force is really nothing but this behaviour. It seems that Berkeley is here very close to Clarke's view 
of forces as revealed in his letters to Leibniz.136 In the  Principles  Berkeley claims that the term 
'attraction' signifies nothing “besides the effect itself”.137 Similarly in De motu Berkeley claims that 
the term 'gravity' means “nothing other than the sensible effect, the cause of which we seek”.138 The 
tone of these passages has led some contemporary thinkers to see Berkeley as a sort of precursor of 
scientific reductionism in the modern sense.139 The central claim of reductionism as a theory of 
science is the claim that that all the sentences about the theoretical entities are fully translatable into 
sentences about the phenomena. In the case of dynamics this amounts to the claim that all the talk 
of forces is fully translatable into talk about motion and rest of bodies.140 If a physicist thus says that 
a  force  of  certain  intensity  was  impressed  on  a  physical  body,  his  sentence  ultimately  says 
something about the kinetic behaviour of the body. Is the interpretation of Berkeley as a reductionist 
justified? I will later in this chapter try to show that it is not.
Force as a mathematical hypothesis
There is, however, one more important characteristic that Berkeley ascribes to physical force. 
This characteristic does not appear in the  Principles, however, it  is repeatedly mentioned in  De 
motu. In these passages, force is described as a sort of fiction, a mere theoretical entity. In section 
39 of De motu Berkeley says that force is like a device of a geometer (such as a geometrical point or 
136See chapter 1.
137Principles 103.
138De motu 22, for similar formulations see sections 6 and 11.
139See e.g. Hinrichs 1950, p. 492.
140Downing 2005, p. 263, fn. 51.
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a perfect circle). It seems to me that this analogy says two things about force. Firstly, it says that 
force is, just like a geometrical point or a perfect circle, nowhere to be found in the physical world, 
it is then not a real quality of physical bodies. Similarly, in another sections of De motu Berkeley 
claims that we should see attraction as a “mathematical hypothesis, and not a physical quality”141. 
Secondly, however, the analogy with a geometrical device shows that force is a useful tool. 
Berkeley  claims  that  concepts  like  attraction  or  force  are  “of  first  utility  for  theories  and 
formulations, as also for computations about motion”.142 Forces are then seen as theoretical tools 
whose  postulation  is  justified  by  their  utility.  Another  passage  of  De motu in  which  Berkeley 
emphasizes the usefulness of the concept of force is section 17 where Berkeley says that terms like 
'force', 'gravity' or 'attraction' are “useful for reasonings and reckonings about motion and bodies in 
motion”.
These and similar passages of  De motu have led some contemporary thinkers to consider 
Berkeley's account of force an instrumentalist one.143 Instrumentalism in the theory of science is a 
view according  to  which  a  theory  is  an instrument,  a  tool  for  making  correct  predictions,144 a 
calculating device.145 The theoretical entities posited by a theory are then not claimed to really exist 
in the physical world, they are posited only in virtue of being useful for scientific explanations, only 
because they are able “to facilitate the business of making correct observational predictions”.146
Tension in Berkeley's concept of force
It seems to me that we might now be able to see a certain tension in Berkeley's concept of 
force. On the one hand force is supposed to be nothing but the kinetic phenomena while on the 
other hand force is  a mathematical hypothesis.  The problem is  that while it  might seem that a 
mathematical hypothesis does not have any existence in the perceived physical world, the kinetic 
phenomena, on the contrary, clearly exist in the perceived physical world where we can observe 
them. Berkeley's concept of force then seems to, at least at first sight, contain an inner contradiction 
because nothing can at the same time exist and not exist in the physical world.
This  inner  tension  in  Berkeley's  concept  has  led  some  thinkers  to  the  question whether 
Berkeley  holds an instrumentalist or a reductionist view of forces.147 The thinkers who say that 
Berkeley's view was (broadly) reductionist put emphasis on the first characteristic mentioned above 
141De motu 28.
142De motu 39.
143See e.g. Downing 2005, p. 248 or Newton-Smith 1985, p. 155.
144Newton-Smith 1985, p. 150.
145Downing 2005, p. 263, fn. 51.
146Newton-Smith 1985, p. 150.
147Downing 2005, p. 263, fn. 51.
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while the thinkers who interpret Berkeley as an instrumentalist tend to emphasize the second one. I 
would now like to try to decide whether either of these interpretations is plausible. In order to do 
that,  however,  I  first  need  to  investigate  whether  the  above-mentioned  apparent  tension  in 
Berkeley's concept is a real tension. Let me therefore start with this question.
I believe there is a real tension between the two kinds of claims Berkeley makes about force, 
because I think that force strictly speaking cannot be both a useful hypothesis and the observable 
behaviour of bodies. After all it seems to me that no x can be a hypothesis – a theoretical entity – 
and some real observable phenomenon at the same time. Is there a way to solve this tension?
I tend to think that one charitable way to deal with this tension is not to take Berkeley's claim 
that force is the observable behaviour of bodies at face value. My interpretive suggestion is that 
Berkeley really thought that force is a hypothesis, a theoretical entity and therefore his claim that 
force is the phenomena has to be understood as not being meant literally. Such an interpretation is 
clearly somewhat controversial. One might challenge it by asking: if, as you claim, Berkeley does 
not really mean that force is the sensible phenomena, why then does he repeatedly say so? It seems 
to me that there are at least three reasons why Berkeley does this.
Firstly, it is worth noticing that in all the passages that I know of which seem to conflict with 
my interpretation148 Berkeley is concerned with a semantic question. He is not directly speaking of 
what force is, about the ontological character of force, but rather about what force-terms signify. On 
the one hand, one might  think that surely the term 'force'  stands for force itself,  and since for 
Berkeley  force  is  not  the  cause  of  the  phenomena,  it  stands  for  the  phenomena  themselves. 
Therefore, one is tempted to conclude, the phenomena just are force. However, one might try to 
resist this interpretation for the following reasons. As we have seen, Berkeley thought that nouns 
are meaningful by standing for ideas or notions. Also, in the previous two chapters I tried to show 
that we do not have an idea or a notion of force. However, Berkeley thinks that the word 'force' is 
still meaningful and the easiest way to explain this is to claim that it stands for the ideas of the 
sensible effects which we get from our sense experience. Therefore, I believe, we should interpret 
Berkeley  as  being  led  by  semantic  considerations  when he  claims  that  force-terms  signify  the 
phenomena. Therefore, it might seem that he does not really think that force just is the phenomena.
Secondly, one cannot help but notice that the context of all of the “problematic” claims is 
Berkeley's criticism of dynamic realism.149 It might be therefore that Berkeley claims that force-
terms only signify the sensible phenomena because he wants to contrast his view with the view of 
the dynamic realist who thinks that force-terms signify the unobservable causes of the phenomena. 
148I.e. Principles 103, De motu 6, 11,22.
149This observation is mentioned in Downing 2005, p. 263, fn. 51.
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It might be that Berkeley did not state his real view of force in these passages because it would 
imply that force-terms signify mere mathematical hypotheses. This view could, however, be seen as 
equally problematic as the realist view because a hypothesis is nothing we have empirical access to. 
Therefore then, I think Berkeley chose the safer strategy of simply saying that force-terms stand for 
the effects, even though he does not really think that forces are the effects.
Thirdly,  it  may  be  that  Berkeley  claims  that  force-terms  signify  the  sensible  phenomena 
simply  because  force  can  be  calculated  by  observing  and  measuring  the  sensible  phenomena, 
therefore by a sort of abstraction from the sensible phenomena. Clearly, even a dynamic realist 
would admit that we can measure forces only indirectly - by measuring their sensible effects, we do 
not have any direct access to them. If we thus know enough about the sensible effects, we can 
calculate the intensity of force. Now if we can calculate force from the sensible effects it means that 
force is a hypothesis that we arrive at purely by considering and measuring the sensible effects. 
Therefore, I think, Berkley might have meant that force is the phenomena in this vague sense.
Was Berkeley an instrumentalist or a reductionist?
Does  my  interpretation  say  anything  about  the  question  whether  Berkeley  was  an 
instrumentalist or a reductionist? It seems to me that it shows that the reductionist interpretation of 
Berkeley is problematic for the following reason. If force is a hypothesis, something which does not 
exist out there in the world, it  seems problematic to claim that force is reducible to the kinetic 
phenomena. I have mentioned that one reason why we might think that force is reducible to the 
observable phenomena is  that all  the talk of forces is  translatable to the talk of the observable 
phenomena.  This  option,  however,  does  not  seem to  be  available  if  we  claim  that  force  is  a 
hypothesis. After all, one sentence we could say about a hypothesis is that it is a mere theoretical 
entity. Now, if reductionism is true, all the talk about forces must be translatable into talk about the 
kinetic behaviour. It seems, however, that there is no way the claim that force is a mere theoretical 
entity could be translated into talk about the behaviour of the observed bodies. I therefore, tend to 
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agree with Downing150 that we should not see Berkeley as a reductionist.151 
Was Berkeley an instrumentalist?  It  seems to me his  account of force has instrumentalist 
features.  He clearly  sees  dynamics  as  a  theory  which  is  very  good at  making  predictions  and 
discovering regularities but also as a theory whose theoretical terms do not correspond to any real 
entities or qualities in the world. The second reason why I tend to think that the instrumentalist 
reading of Berkeley is correct is that he repeatedly emphasizes the usefulness of dynamic concepts. 
According to Newton-Smith, for an instrumentalist “the aim of the scientific enterprise is merely 
the  production  of  theories  that  are  empirically  adequate  in  the  sense  that  they  give  successful 
observational  predictions”.152 The  status  of  the  theoretical  sentences  in  instrumentalism is  thus 
different from the status of the observational ones. While the observational sentences express facts 
about the world and are either true or false, the theoretical sentences either do not have a truth value 
(in the case of 'semantic instrumentalism') or they have a truth value but it is considered irrelevant 
(in the case of 'epistemological instrumentalism'). The theoretical sentences then do not tell us truths 
about the world, they only help us arrive at truths about the world in the form of correct predictions. 
Newton-Smith  the  attributes  to  Berkeley  semantic  instrumentalism  “in  at  least  an  embryonic 
form”.153
It seems to me that even though Berkeley of course never explicitly embraces this view, it is 
implicitly present in what he says about force in De motu. Namely, I believe that if we claim that 
force is a mere mathematical hypothesis, we have to treat sentences in which we ascribe forces to 
bodies as sentences, strictly speaking, without a truth value. I therefore tend to agree with Newton-
Smith that Berkeley's view of Newtonian dynamics can be called semantic instrumentalism.
I have thus tried to show that for Berkeley force is a mathematical hypothesis. Such a claim, 
of course, leaves a lot unanswered.  It  is interesting to ask, for example,  what exactly Berkeley 
means  when  he  speaks  about  a  hypothesis.  Firstly,  it  is  not  clear  whether  he  understood  by 
'hypothesis' a proposition (such as “Bodies have forces”) or a fictional entity (such as “force” or 
150Lisa Downing argues that Berkeley was an instrumentalist. She offers three reasons for her interpretation. The first 
reason is that whenever Berkeley justifies the use of hypotheses and fictions he does so by pointing out their utility, 
not their translatability into kinematic motions. If a theory uses fictions or hypotheses, it needs to justify the use of 
these. One sort of justification could be that these entities are useful for explanations, another reason could be the 
fact that these hypotheses or fictions are fully translatable to the observable phenomena and the theory can therefore 
legitimately use them and clearly, Berkeley never directly mentions translatability. Downing's second reason for her 
claim that Berkeley was an instrumentalist about force is that she thinks the passages which sound reductionist 
should be understood as merely criticizing dynamical realism by stressing that forces aren't any extra entities 
existing apart from the observable phenomena. The third reasons Downing uses to support her interpretation is the 
fact that in Berkeley's later work Siris, published in 1744, i.e. more than two decades after De motu, where Berkeley 
specifically says that “motions only, and not the forces, are indeed in the bodies” and thus, Downing thinks, rejects 
the reductionist view.
151Downing 2005, p. 263, fn. 51.
152Newton-Smith 1985, p. 150.
153Ibid., p. 155.
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“gravity”). In De motu 61 Berkeley gives us an example of a geometrical  hypothesis. He remarks 
that “a curve can be considered as consisting of an infinite number of straight lines, though in fact it 
does not consist of them. That hypothesis is useful in geometry. Here then, the term 'hypotheis' 
seems to refer to a theoretical proposition rather than to a particular fictional object. Other passages, 
however, suggest that Berkeley means fictional or hypothetical entities rather than propositions. In 
De motu 28, for example, Berkeley says that attraction is “a mathematical hypothesis, and not a 
physical  quality”.  In  De motu  39,  similarly,  Berkeley  speaks  of  fictional  entities  like  force  or 
attraction,  which  do  not  really  exist  in  bodies,  and  compares  them to  “geometers'  fictions”  or 
“devices”.  Berkeley's  use  of  the  term  'mathematical  hypothesis  then  seems  to  be  somewhat 
ambiguous (see Downing, 2005, p. 263, fn. 50). It seems to me, however, that his central use of the 
term  'hypothesis'  in  De  motu  amounts  to  fictional  entities  rather  than  propositions.  After  all, 
Berkeley's concern in the relevant passages is the question what is force and we have no reason to 
suppose that he thought that force was a proposition.
Another question one might like to ask about Berkeley's concept of force as a mathematical 
hypothesis is whether this hypothesis is necessary for anyone who wants to understand nature and 
formulate the laws of nature or if this hypothesis is just something that simplifies the formulation of 
these laws for the human minds with their limited capacities. Another way to ask this question is to 
ask,  whether  for Berkeley the concept  of  force would figure in the physical  description of  the 
natural world done by a superhuman mind. It seems to me that one way to approach this question is 
to  try  to  see  the  parallel  with  other  mathematical  hypotheses.  The  problem of  course  is  that, 
Berkeley doesn't say very much about what he means by these hypotheses apart from the fact that 
they are useful for calculations. One might speculate that one such a mathematical hypothesis is the 
square root of minus one.154 Even thought there is nothing in the world that would correspond to 
such a number, the number is, nevertheless, highly useful in mathematical calculations and it seems 
that certain mathematical calculations could not be done without it. Therefore it seems that, if the 
square  root  of  minus  one  is  a  mathematical  hypothesis,  it  is  a  necessary  hypothesis,  not  just 
something that makes calculations easier for limited minds.
Similarly, we can perhaps use the example of a geometrical proof of the fact that the three 
angles in a triangle always add to 180 degrees. To do this proof we need to use a geometrical 
hypothesis  of a straight line parallel  to one of the sides of of the triangle such that the vertice 
opposite this side lies on this parallel straight line. It seems to me that we can treat the parallel 
straight line as a geometrical hypothesis. If it is a hypothesis, it seems to be a necessary hypothesis 
since there does not seem to be another way to prove or demonstrate that the angles in a triangle add 
154Berkeley discusses this number in Alciphron.
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to 180 degrees. Thirdly, if a geometrical point is a geometrical hypothesis (there are no geometrical 
points in the natural world), it is, I think, a necessary hypothesis because it has to figure in any 
geometry. It seems therefore that if Berkeley thinks that force is a hypothesis in any of these senses, 
then he must have thought that it is a necessary hypothesis. From this we may conclude that he 
thought that forces necessarily figure in the laws of nature.
To conclude, I would like to raise one question regarding Berkeley's account of force. I have 
argued that  for Berkeley force is  a  mathematical  hypothesis  arrived at  by abstraction from the 
sensible natural phenomena. Now, it seems to me that one might object to this that perhaps this 
view of force is equally problematic from the point of view of Berkley's metaphysics, epistemology 
and semantics as is the realist view (see chapter 2). Let me just briefly outline this objection. It is 
not clear what the ontological status of a hypothesis would be for Berkeley. Also, it is not clear 
whether, if force is a hypothesis, we can have a notion or an idea of force. If so, however, it is still 
not clear what force-terms refer to.
It  seems to me that  Berkeley was aware of this  problem, because he seems to suggest  a 
solution to it in the seventh dialogue of Alciphron.155 There he discusses the significance of words 
like like 'force', 'God's grace' or number-words. He claims that even though we do not have clear 
ideas or notions which these words would stand for, they are still very useful and beneficial in the 
conduct  of  our  lives  and  it  is  their  use  or  their  function  which  makes  them  meaningful  and 
significant. The character of Euphranor claims here that "though it seems neither you nor I can form 
distinct simple ideas of number, we can nevertheless make a very proper and significant use of 
numeral names. They direct us in the disposition and management of our affairs, and are of such 
necessary use, that we should not know how to do without them”.156We can see Berkeley as saying 
here that the utility of a certain term in guiding our lives gives the term its significance. In the case 
of force, Berkeley specifically emphasizes the utility of dynamics in the construction of engines “by 
means of which thing difficult and otherwise impossible may be performed”.157 Even though we 
then, according to Berkeley, do not have an idea or a notion of force, we still can use force as a 
mathematical hypothesis in physical calculations because we, nevertheless, have a meaningful term 
at our disposal.  Therefore I believe the concept of force as a mathematical hypothesis is not in 
conflict with Berkeley's overall philosophical position.
155Alciphron VII. 7.
156Alciphron VII.5.
157Ibid. VII.7.
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Conclusion
In the first  chapter of this  essay I discuss Newton's views of forces and I show that one 
possible interpretation of Newton is to see him as a dynamic realist. In the second chapter I try to 
show Berkeley's reasons for rejecting the realist view of forces. I argue that dynamic realism is in 
conflict  with both his  metaphysics and his epistemology. In the third section I discuss three of 
Berkeley's arguments against realism about forces. I try to show that while these arguments expose 
some of the problems of dynamic realism, they do not, in my view, show that any form of dynamic 
realism must be false. In the fourth and final section of this essay I discuss the positive part of 
Berkeley's project, the concept of force presented in Berkeley's  De motu.  I argue that there is a 
tension between the claims that Berkeley makes about force in De motu and offer an interpretation 
of Berkeley as an attempt at avoiding this tension. According to my interpretation, Berkeley's view 
of  force  is  an  instrumentalist  one.  Lastly  I  consider  certain  aspects  of  the  view of  force  as  a 
mathematical hypothesis and try to show that while such a view might seem to be in conflict with 
Berkeley's  semantic  and  metaphysical  views,  it  needn't  be  so  if  we  consider  the  semantic 
considerations introduced in Berkeley's Alciphron.
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Summary:
The  essay  concerns  Berkeley's  reaction  to  Newton's  dynamics.  While  Berkeley  admires  the 
usefulness, simplicity and generality of Newton's laws of motion, he is, none the less, concerned 
with  their  possible  ontological  implications.  If  we  interpret  Newton  in  a  realist  manner,  his 
doctrines seem to imply that physical objects are active and are thus inconsistent with the basic 
principles of Berkeley's  metaphysics, namely with the view that the only sources of activity in the 
universe are spirits. Berkeley tries to solve this conflict by offering an account of force according to 
which force is a mathematical hypothesis and which thus avoids metaphysical commitments. The 
author suggests that there is a tension between different claims that Berkeley makes about force in 
De motu  and offers an interpretation of Berkeley's view in which he tries to avoid this tension. 
According to the offered interpretation, Berkeley's view of force is an instrumentalist one. In the 
last  chapter  various  aspects  of  Berkeley's  view  of  force  as  a  mathematical  hypothesis  are 
considered. It is argued that even though such a view might seem to be in conflict with Berkeley's 
semantic and metaphysical views, it needn't be so if certain semantic considerations introduced in 
Berkeley's Alciphron are considered.
Résumé:
Práce se týká Berkeleyho reakce na newtonovskou dynamiku. Berkeley na jednu stranu obdivuje 
užitečnost,  jednoduchost  a obecnost Newtonových pohybových zákonů,  na druhou stranu si  ale 
uvědomuje jejich možné nežádoucí ontologické implikace. Pokud totiž interpretujeme Newtona v 
realistickém  duchu,  jeho  nauky,  zdá  se,  implikují,  že  fyzické  předměty  jsou  aktivní.  Proto  je 
realisticky chápaná Newtonova nauka v příkrém rozporu s Berkeleyho názorem, že jedinými zdroji 
aktivity v univerzu jsou duchové. Berkeley se pokouší vyřešit tento konflikt tím, že nabízí koncept 
síly  jako  matematické  hypotézy.  Pokud  totiž  sílu  chápeme  takto,  zdá  se  že  jsme  se  zbavili 
nepřijatelných metafyzických závazků. Podle autora je mezi jednotlivými tvrzeními, která Berkeley 
činí o síle ve spise O pohybu jisté napětí a navrhuje interpretaci Berkeleyho koncepce, která se má 
tomuto  napětí  vyhnout.  Podle  této  interpretace  má  Berkeleyho  koncept  síly  instrumentalistický 
charakter.  Závěrem  se  pak  autor  zabývá  vybranými  aspekty  Berkeleyho  konceptu  síly  jako 
matematické  hypotézy  a  tvrdí,  že  i  přesto,  že  by  se  mohlo  toto  pojetí  zdát  být  v  nesouladu  s 
Berkeleyho metafyzickým stanoviskem, tento zdánlivý nesoulad se rozplyne, vezmeme-li v úvahu 
sémantickou koncepci představenou v Berkeleyho Alkifrónu.
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